Publications

Reexamining the Psychophysical Evidence for the Two Visual Streams. Philosophy of Science. 2024. [Open Access] 

The perception/action model posits distinct streams of visual processing for perception and online motor guidance. This model is apparently supported by experiments showing that visual illusions affect action tasks less than perception. In recent years, however, critics have argued against both the validity of these experiments and their support (irrespective of their validity) for the perception/action model. In this paper, I reexamine this psychophysical evidence. I argue that it strongly supports the existence of distinct representations for ‘perception’ and ‘action’ but only moderately supports the existence of distinct systems generating those representations.

Responsibility and Perception. The Journal of Philosophy. 2024. [Draft] [Published]

I argue that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences—experiences whose causes were not appropriately regulated by the subject—are doxastically unjustified. In section 1, I articulate the view I am defending. In section 2, I defend the premise that an expert perceiver’s belief, but not that of a similarly situated novice, is unjustified when they fail to follow appropriate perceptual rules. In section 3, I show that this difference is best explained by irresponsible experience formation. In section 4, I show that the epistemic relevance of responsible experience formation has broad implications for theorizing about perceptual justification.  The perception/action model posits distinct streams of visual processing for perception and online motor guidance. This model is apparently supported by experiments showing that visual illusions affect action tasks less than perception. In recent years, however, critics have argued against both the validity of these experiments and their support (irrespective of their validity) for the perception/action model. In this paper, I reexamine this psychophysical evidence. I argue that it strongly supports the existence of distinct representations for ‘perception’ and ‘action’ but only moderately supports the existence of distinct systems generating those representations.

Visual Streams as Core Mechanisms. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2024. [Draft][Published] 

Milner and Goodale (2006) argue that the ventral and dorsal streams of cortical processing are independent modules for different functions, perception and online motor control respectively. But this conception is undermined by evidence for functional and informational connectivity between the streams. I present a new conception of the visual streams on which they are core mechanisms for different person-level functional roles. I defend this view by arguing that it better accords with the empirical evidence and helps us better understand the role that the streams play in the study of visual perception.

(Un)conscious Perspectival Shape and Attention Guidance in Visual Search: A reply to Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020). Conscious and Unconscious States and Processes: Examining their Nature, Similarities, and Differences. Routledge. Forthcoming. (w/ Assaf Weksler) [Draft] 

When viewing a circular coin rotated in depth, it fills an elliptical region of the visual scene. For some, this appears to generate a two-fold experience, in which one sees the coin as simultaneously circular (in light of its 3D shape) and elliptical (in light of its 2D ‘perspectival shape’ or ‘p-shape’). An energetic philosophical debate asks whether the latter p-shapes are genuinely presented in perceptual experience (as ‘perspectivalists’ argue) or if, instead, this appearance is somehow derived or inferred from experience (as ‘anti-perspectivalists’ argue). This debate, however, has largely turned on introspection. In a recent study, Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020) aim to provide the first empirical test of this question. They asked subjects to find an elliptical coin seen face-on from a search array that also included a circular coin seen either face-on or at an angle. They found that subjects reacted more slowly when the distracting circle was seen at an angle. From this, they concluded that the similar p-shape between the ellipse and circle constituted a phenomenal similarity between the two, and thus that perspectivalism is true. We show that these results can also be explained by pre-attentive guidance by unconscious representations (in what follows, just “unconscious pre-attentive guidance”) and that this explanation is at least as plausible as one from phenomenal similarity. Thus, we conclude that the experiment does not support perspectivalism over anti- perspectivalism.

A Fresh Look at the Two Visual Streams. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2021. Winner of the Antwerp Centre for Philosophical Psychology Essay Prize. [Draft] [Published]

I defend a new account of the function of the “ventral” and “dorsal" streams of visual processing. On Milner and Goodale’s (2006) account, the streams constitute isolated processing systems, each with a proprietary function: ventral stream generates perceptual experiences while dorsal stream guides motor activity. This account is challenged by evidence for functional connections between the streams and for each stream’s involvement in the other’s “proprietary” function. I show that a weaker view—that dorsal stream representations directly guide motor activity, without cognitive intermediaries—is consistent with such evidence, but has the same theoretical and methodological implications for the perceiving mind.

Current working papers 

• Paper on 'shallow' vs. 'deep' benchmarks in AI research (w/ Alex Grzankowski and Herman Cappelen)

• Paper on whether 'deep' approaches to AI alignment should be integrated or modular

• Paper on AI pain (w/ Casey O'Callaghan)

• Paper on AI embodiment (w/ Stephen Gadsby)

• Paper on the function of functional division in the visual system (under review)